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Ab s t ra c t
T hi s p ap e r an al y se s t he i m pa ct o f a l te rn at i ve m eas u re s o f …r ms ’ … na nc i al hea l t h
on the i r i nves tme nt a nd e m pl oy ment d eci s i on s . T he e mp ha s i s i s on t he a na l y s i s o f d i s -
ag gr eg at ed da ta on s uch …n an ci al ind i ca to rs . For th is p ur p os e, ite mi se d da ta fr o m a
sample of the non-…nancial …rms rep orting to the Banco de España Central Balance
Sh ee t Da ta O ¢ce An nua l Da tab as e f or th e p er io d 1 985 -2 001 is u s ed . We …n d th at c or -
p or a te … na nc i al p o s i ti on -pr oxied by al ter na tive in di ca tor s - a ¤ect s b us i nes s a cti vity an d
th at th is impac t is n on -lin ea r an d b ec omes r el at ive l y mor e i nt ense whe n …n an cia l p re s -
sure excee ds a c ertain threshold. We also construct, usi ng di¤erent …nanci al variabl es,
co mp os ite i n di cat or s th at su m ma ri ze th e n on -lin ea r i mp ac t t ha t th e … na nc i al p os i t i o n
ha s o n i nves tment a nd e m pl oy ment . O ur r e s u l t s s ug ge st t ha t the us e of …r m-l e vel d at a
is partic ul arly rele vant i n episo des where the …nancial pressure on a signi …cant numb er
of …rms reaches levels at which it has a pronounced in‡uence on real activity. In these
episodes, indicators based on aggregate data may not reliably re‡ect the system’s …nan-
ci al sou nd ne s s s in ce t he y d o no t ad equ at ely r e‡e ct t he vu ln er abi lity of th e mo st f ra gil e
co mpa nie s.
JEL Codes: C33, E22, G32, J23.
Key words: financial conditions; fixed investment; employment.
1 Introduction
The …nancial position of the corporate sector may in‡uence the performance of the real
economy and the stability of the …nancial system through its contribution to aggregate
demand and its links to the banking system and capital markets. Thus, for instance,
excessive indebtedness may restrict the ability of companies to access additional external
funds and, as a consequence, it may adversely a¤ect their expansionary capacity. In fact,
adjustment by companies to changes in the …nancial pressure they face (for instance,
as a result of a monetary policy shift) can potentially involve a wide range of activities,
with the most prominent relating to their investment decisions, human resource policies
and …nancial policies (see Benito and Young, 2002 or Benito and Hernando, 2002).
Therefore, the analysis of the …nancial health of the corporate sector is an important
ingredient for an adequate assessment of the macroeconomic outlook.
From the standpoint of identifying the risks to macroeconomic and …nancial
stability, it should be borne in mind that basing the assessment of the …nancial position
of companies on an analysis of aggregate sectoral indices may, while being informative,
occasionally cover up vulnerabilities that only a study at a greater level of detail can
reveal. In this sense, the implications for the …nancial strength of the Spanish corporate
sector of the increasing debt ratios observed at an aggregate level (see Figure 1) may
di¤er depending on the distribution of indebtedness across …rms. Therefore, this paper
investigates the impact of …nancial variables on real activity, placing the emphasis on the
analysis of disaggregated data. In particular, making use of microeconometric methods
(panel techniques) and itemised data from a sample of the non-…nancial …rms reporting
to the Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data O¢ce Annual Database for the
period 1985-2001, we analyse the sensitivity of …xed investment and employment to a
relatively broad set of indicators that are usually considered to characterise the …nancial
position of …rms. Among these, we include variables providing information on corporate
pro…tability, …nancial burden and indebtedness (or leverage).
In our view, the main value added of the paper is twofold. First, we evaluate
whether the impact of the …nancial position on business decisions is non-linear. In
particular, our conjecture is that this relationship becomes relatively more intense when
…nancial pressure exceeds a certain threshold. Furthermore, we analyse whether the
relevant threshold di¤ers depending on the real decision considered. Second, in the
light of the estimated impacts of the di¤erent …nancial variables on …rms’ real decisions,
we construct a composite indicator of …nancial pressure as a weighted average of di¤erent
…nancial variables. Again, we investigate to what extent the weights attached to the
di¤erent …nancial proxies di¤er for employment and for …xed investment.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a prelim-
inary look at the descriptive information of the cross-sectional distribution of …nancial
variables o¤ering an overall assessment of …nancial pressure experienced by the Spanish
corporate sector over the period 1985 to 2001. Section 3 describes the baseline speci…-
cations for …xed investment and employment, summarises the estimation methods and
presents the basic estimation results. Section 4 analyses whether the impact of the
…nancial position on corporate decisions becomes relatively more intense when …nancial
tightness exceeds a certain threshold, whilst Section 5 constructs composite indicators
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of …nancial pressure, in the light of the estimated impacts of the di¤erent …nancial
variables on …rms’ real decisions. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The …nancial position of the Spanish corporate sector:
a preliminary look at …rm-level data
With perfect capital markets, the value of a …rm is not determined by its …nancial
structure and, consequently, the real activity of the …rm is independent of its …nancing
choice (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, …nancial markets are not perfect. The
existence of capital market frictions (asymmetric information problems, agency con‡icts
between shareholders and managers, distortionary taxation) implies the break-up of the
separation between investment and …nancing decisions. Hence, the …nancial perfor-
mance and …nancing decisions of …rms as well as their responses to …nancial pressure
are important to both a country’s macroeconomic conditions and the stability of its …-
nancial system. Furthermore, when assessing the risks to macroeconomic and …nancial
stability, it should be borne in mind that the fragility of certain …rms will not necessarily
be o¤set by the soundness of others. Accordingly, the use of aggregate indicators to
assess the …nancial position of the corporate sector and its impact on real activity may
be inadequate and thus a study at a greater level of detail may be required. Indeed, the
behaviour of the companies most exposed …nancially is, for these purposes, as relevant
(if not more so) as the average behaviour of the sector. Against this background, the
purpose of this section is twofold. First, we attempt to provide an overall picture of the
…nancial position of Spanish non-…nancial companies and its evolution over the period
considered. Second, we try to assess to what extent the real behaviour -more precisely,
the demand for factors of production- of the more …nancially vulnerable …rms di¤ers
from that of …rms with an average …nancial position.
The data employed are derived from an annual survey of non-…nancial …rms con-
ducted by the Central Balance Sheet Data O¢ce of the Banco de España (see Banco
de España, 2002). This is a large scale survey used extensively by the Banco de Es-
paña to inform its assessment of the Spanish corporate sector. In terms of gross value
added the survey respondents jointly represent around 35 per cent of the total gross
value added of the non-…nancial corporate sector in Spain, and the pattern of evolution
of the aggregate values for the main variables used here (employment, investment) is
quite similar to that observed in the whole economy. This paper employs data for the
period 1985 to 2001 for which the coverage of the survey has been relatively stable.
Data are only used when there are at least 5 consecutive time-series observations per
company. This produces an unbalanced sample of 7,547 non-…nancial companies and
70,625 observations with between 5 and 17 annual observations per company (see Data
Appendix).
Table 1 presents median values for the di¤erent variables used in our analysis for
subsample periods.1 The most important aggregate variation observed in (pro)cyclical
variables such as …xed investment and cash ‡ow re‡ects the recession in Spain, the
trough of which was experienced in 1993. Also clear from Table 1 is the declining debt-
1See Data Appendix for more precise de…nitions of the variables used in the paper.
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service burden apparent in the late 1990s. A median value for the interest debt burden
term idb, of 0.216 and 0.214 for 1989-92 and 1993-96, respectively, compares to a …gure
of 0.100 for 1997-2001. This reduction primarily re‡ects reductions in nominal interest
rates and the entry of Spain into the European Monetary Union.2
This section presents, in primarily graphical form, preliminary data analysis of
the sample of Spanish non-…nancial …rms. This analysis …rst illustrates variation in the
cross-sectional distributions of …nancial and real variables and how these distributions
have changed over time. Then, a comparison is made of the behaviour of investment
and labour demand for various sets of …rms de…ned in terms of their …nancial position,
using alternative indicators to proxy the degree of …nancial pressure on the companies.
First, we consider a narrow de…nition of the debt-service burden that is de…ned
as the ratio of interest payments on debt to the company’s gross revenue (interest debt
burden). The cross-sectional distribution of this variable and how it varies over time is
shown in Figure 2.1. Di¤erent percentiles (ie. the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th) in the
cross-sectional distribution for each year are displayed. The experience of the median
company (the 50th percentile) is indicative of the typical Spanish company in each
year, whilst the higher percentiles indicate the experience of those companies facing
more intense …nancial pressure. Consider the median company (the 50th percentile)
…rst. Its interest payments relative to gross operating pro…t fell during the mid-1980s
but then began to increase at the end of the 1980s before again declining as growth
resumed following the recession of the early 1990s. Variation in this ratio re‡ects a
combination of variation in interest rates, company pro…tability and indebtedness. The
variable peaked in 1993 from which point it has declined steadily. An important …nding
from Figure 2.1 is that as interest rates have fallen from the mid-1990s, the implied
reduction in …nancial pressure has been felt throughout the cross-sectional distribution
of …rms in Spain and, indeed, is strongest for the more …nancially vulnerable. At the
75th percentile of the distribution, the interest debt burden fell from 0.66 in 1993 to
0.25 in 2001. This is a positive development for the …nancial stability associated with
the corporate sector in Spain. It also contrasts with the experience during the recession,
at its deepest in 1993, when the …nancial pressure on the most vulnerable companies
increased relative to the more typical companies suggesting that aggregate data on debt
burdens at the time understated the vulnerability of the most fragile companies and
hence of the system as a whole.
A very similar pattern emerges when considering a broader measure of the debt-
service burden as a proportion of gross revenue that includes not only interest payments
but also the stock of short-term debt. As can be seen from Figure 2.2 where the cross-
sectional distribution of the total debt burden is displayed, the highest variation in this
ratio is experienced by the most vulnerable companies, i.e. those in the upper decile of
this distribution.
The cross-sectional distribution of corporate indebtedness, de…ned as the ratio
of total outstanding debt to total assets, is illustrated in Figure 2.3. Similarly, Figure
2.4 depicts the cross-sectional distribution of net indebtedness. Both …gures show a
2Nominal short-term interest rates in Spain were in the range 12 to 16 per cent (annual averages) in
the period from 1985 to 1990, from which point they were reduced steadily to reach 4 per cent by 2000
with Spain being one of the euro area economies on January 1st 1999.
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remarkable stability in the cross-sectional distribution of indebtedness of …rms. It should
be noted that stability in the company-level cross-sectional distribution can be consistent
with aggregate movements in a variable and with variation for individual companies. For
instance, the aggregate data corresponding to that in Figure 2.4 indicate an increase
in indebtedness from 32.4% in 1997 to 38.6% by 2001. This is explained by large
…rms increasing their debt levels. The stability of the cross-sectional distribution of
indebtedness among Spanish …rms also contrasts with …ndings for UK quoted …rms
where a marked increase in dispersion in recent years has been found (Benito and
Vlieghe, 2000).
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate two measures of pro…tability: gross revenue and
cash-‡ow, in both cases divided by total assets. Two key observations arise from these
…gures. First, pro…tability is clearly procyclical as we would expect. At the median,
gross revenue (cash-‡ow) over total assets declined from 21.9% (13.5%) in 1988 to 13.9%
(7.1%) in 1993, from which point it has since recovered steadily, reaching 15.2% (10.3%)
in 2001. Second, the experience of the median …rm understates variation at the upper
tail of the cross-sectional distribution, and in the case of the cash-‡ow measure also at
the lower tail. For …nancial stability issues it is the lower tail that is more relevant and
here (i.e. at the 10th percentile) cash-‡ow over total assets fell from 1.7% in 1988 to
–7.5% in 1993.
The cross-sectional distributions of …xed investment and employment growth
are also considered in Figures 2.7 and 2.8, respectively. Investment is procyclical as
expected. In particular, it declines in the recession of 1993 and especially so at the top
of the cross-sectional distribution, namely at the 90th percentile. Employment growth
at the median …rm varies relatively little during the sample period, but becomes negative
for the only time during the period in 1993. This disguises more signi…cant variation
at both the upper and lower tails of the distribution, which show even stronger declines
in the recession of 1993, coinciding with increases in the …nancial pressure of borrowing
costs, as shown above.
This descriptive analysis has shown that there is substantial cross-sectional vari-
ation in the distribution of Spanish …rms for each of the variables examined. To the
extent that the real behaviour di¤ers across companies facing di¤erent degrees of …-
nancial pressure, the assessment of the …nancial position of the corporate sector should
ideally adopt a disaggregated perspective. To emphasise the relevance of this issue, in
what follows we illustrate how investment in physical capital and labour demand di¤er
across companies with di¤erent …nancial positions. For this purpose, Figure 3 compares
the average level of both real variables in di¤erent corporate groupings de…ned on the
basis of their …nancial position, proxied by alternative indicators. Each panel of the
…gure presents the average value of a real variable (the investment rate or the growth
rate of employment) for the …rms belonging to three di¤erent deciles of the distribution
de…ned in terms of a …nancial indicator (the interest debt burden, the total debt burden,
the debt ratio or gross revenue over total assets). The median decile (that including the
…rms between percentiles 45 and 55) can be regarded as representative of the behaviour
of a …rm in an average …nancial position. Analogously, the top (bottom) decile includes
the 10% of …rms with the highest (lowest) value of the corresponding …nancial indicator.
First, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 compare the behaviour of …rms facing di¤erent degrees
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of …nancial pressure, this being proxied by means of a measure of the relative burden
of debt (or, in other words, of the …rms’ capacity to meet interest payments), i.e. our
interest debt burden (idb) variable, which is de…ned as the ratio of interest payments
to gross revenue. This variable, being the net result of changes in interest rates, in
corporate pro…tability and in corporate debt, is a relevant indicator of the …nancial
pressure …rms may be facing. In Figures 3.1 and 3.2, no marked di¤erences in demand
for factors of production are observed between the …rms with lowest …nancial pressure
and those with average …nancial pressure. However, …rms with a higher …nancial burden
in relation to their capacity to generate funds from operations have substantially lower
investment and employment growth rates. Moreover, in the case of employment, this
di¤erence seems more marked in recessionary phases.
Ac cor di ng t o Fig ur es 3. 3 an d 3. 4, s imila r co nc l u si on s ca n b e d raw n w he n th e
comparison is established in terms of our total debt burden variable (tdb). Thus, those
companies facing a higher total …nancial burden display substantially lower investment
and employment growth rates. Di¤erences are less marked between the …rms with the
lowest total …nancial burden and those subject to average …nancial pressure, especially
in the case of employment growth.
Interestingly, the pattern of results changes when the level of indebtedness is
used as the indicator of …nancial tightness. Thus, in Figure 3.5, the observed rela-
tionship between the investment rate and the debt ratio is not monotonic. Similarly,
no signi…cant di¤erences in employment growth are observed among the three deciles
considered (Figure 3.6). This absence of a clear relationship between the debt level
and the level of activity at the company level may be interpreted as the consequence
of two opposite e¤ects. On the one hand, …rms with high indebtedness may experience
di¢culties in gaining access to additional credit to …nance new investment projects, but,
on the other hand, those companies with higher levels of investment and employment
growth are those companies that have been successful in attracting external funds to
take advantage of their growth opportunities
Finally, Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show a clear link between the level of pro…tability
and the demand for factors of production. Firms with higher levels of gross revenues
over total assets have substantially higher investment and employment growth rates.
Overall, the evidence in this section suggests: …rst, that there is a substantial
dispersion in the distribution of Spanish …rms in terms of several indicators of the degree
of …nancial tightness they face. Second, that …nancial position a¤ects business activity;
and, third, that this impact is not linear and becomes relatively more intense when
…nancial pressure exceeds a certain threshold.
3 The impact of …nancial variables on …rms’ real decisions
The estimation analysis in this section considers the responsiveness of …xed investment
and employment to changes in the …nancial conditions facing a company, proxied by a
set of …nancial variables. These variables include indicators providing information on
corporate pro…tability, indebtedness (or leverage) and the relative burden of debt and
try to capture the degree of …nancial pressure …rms may be facing. More precisely, the
…nancial variables considered are: two measures of the debt-service burden, tdb and idb,
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two measures capturing the indebtedness of the company,(B=A) and ((B¡m)=A), and
two measures of corporate pro…tability, (GR=A) and (CF=A). Finally, we also consider
an indicator of the probability of default that has been constructed using the estimated
coe¢cients of a Probit model for the probability of default estimated by Benito et al.
(2003) for a similar sample of Spanish non-…nancial …rms.
3.1 Baseline speci…cations
The model estimated for …xed investment is an error-correction model which speci…es
a target level of the capital stock and allows for a ‡exible speci…cation of the short-run
investment dynamics, in which we add di¤erent …nancial indicators as potential explana-
tory variables. More structural models, such as Q models, would be more appropriate
from a theoretical point of view, because they control for expectational in‡uences on the
investment decision and it can therefore be argued that …nancial variables should not
enter this speci…cation as proxies for future investment opportunities (see, for example,
Fazzari et al., 1988). However, this type of models may be signi…cantly a¤ected by
measurement error and have often failed to produce signi…cant and correctly signed key
parameters. For this reason, we estimate an error correction model of investment, which
i s s t an da rd i n th e i nve s tment l i t er at ur e.3 As is e mp ha s ised i n Bon d et al . (1999), this
model, when estimated, usually displays reasonable long-run and short-run properties.
Starting from a general expression for the desired capital stock, assuming an
autoregressive-distributed lag speci…cation for the short-run dynamics, subsuming the
depreciation rate into the unobserved …rm-speci…c e¤ects and assuming that variation
in the user cost of capital can be controlled for by including both time-speci…c and …rm-
sp ec i…c e¤e ct s, th e fo llowin g sp e ci… ca tio n f o r t he investment r ate ca n b e o bt ain ed 4 :
µ
I
K
¶
it
= ®i + ¯1
µ
I
K
¶
it¡1
+ ¯2¢yit+ ¯3¢yit¡1+ ¯4 (k ¡ y)it¡2+X 0it°+ µt+ "it (1)
where i indexes companies i=1...N and t indexes years, t=1...T . ¢ denotes a
…rst di¤erence, I=K is the investment rate, y is the log of real sales, k is the log of
real …xed capital stock, ®i are company-speci…c …xed e¤ects, and X represents a vector
of …nancial variables. µt are time e¤ects that control for macroeconomic in‡uences
on …xed investment common across companies and "it is a serially-uncorrelated, but
possibly heteroskedastic error term. The coe¢cients ¯2 and ¯3 indicate the short-run
responsiveness of …xed investment to sales growth, whilst the coe¢cient ¯4 indicates
the speed of adjustment of the capital stock towards its desired level.
The labour demand equation is derived from a quadratic adjustment cost model.
For this reason, we include lagged employment as a regressor. We then add …nancial
factors, as in Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999). Therefore, the demand equation takes the
following form:
3In any case, a Q model is not possible here, since most of the Spanish …rms are not quoted so that
the usual Q variable cannot be constructed.
4See Bond et al. (1999) or Bond et al. (2003) for details on the derivation of the investment model.
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nit = Ái + ¸1nit¡1 + ¸2kit + ¸3wit¡1 + ¸4¢wit + ¸5»it +X
0
i´ +ªt + ¹it (2)
where i indexes companies i=1,2..N and t indexes year t=1,2..T . n is (log)
average company employment during the year, w is the (log) average real wage at the
company, k denotes (log) real …xed capital stock. » is a demand shock proxy which
consists of the growth in log real sales and ªt represents a set of common time e¤ects
(year dummies) which will control for aggregate e¤ects including aggregate demand.5
¹it is a serially uncorrelated but possibly heteroskedastic error term.
Two elements in equation (2) depart from what is a standard speci…cation for
labour demand. First, …nancial factors, represented by the regressors Xi, are included.
Despite the extensive literature considering a potential role for …nancial conditions in
shaping …xed investment (see Hubbard, 1998), there are few studies which allow for such
a role in the context of labour demand models.6 Second, the model includes a demand
shock variable, »it, following Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992). Nevertheless, as in the
case of …xed investment, a note of caution should be introduced since this reduced-form
model of labour demand does not control for expectational in‡uences and therefore, it
might be argued that …nancial variables are to some extent capturing future demand.
3.2 Estimation method
The estimation method consists of the GMM-System estimator proposed by Arellano
and Bover (1995) and examined in detail by Blundell and Bond (1998). These models
control for …xed e¤ects, with the estimator being an extension of the GMM estimator
of Arellano and Bond (1991), which estimates equations in levels as well as in …rst-
di¤erences.
Appart from the bias that would arise if …xed e¤ects were not controlled for, it is
also necessary to note that most current …rm-speci…c variables are endogenous. In order
to avoid the bias associated with this endogeneity problem, we use a GMM estimator
taking lags of the dependent and explanatory variables as instruments.
The use of a GMM-System estimator is justi…ed because in autoregressive models
with high persistence in the data such that the lagged levels of a variable are not highly
correlated with the …rst di¤erence, the …rst-di¤erenced estimator may be subject to …nite
sample biases associated with weak instruments (see Blundell and Bond, 1998). Blundell
and Bond (1998) show that in these circumstances also including the levels equations
in the system estimator o¤ers signi…cant gains, countering the bias. Blundell and Bond
(1998) also show that in autoregresive-distributed lag models, …rst-di¤erences of the
variables can be used as instruments in the levels equations provided that they are mean
stationary. The high levels of serial correlation displayed by several variables included
in the models and the fact that most of them can be regarded as mean stationary favour
the use of a GMM-System estimator.
5The demand shock variable is not considered in the analysis of Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), but it
was included in a similar speci…cation by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992).
6Some exceptions are Nickell and Wadhwani (1991), Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) and Ogawa (2003).
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The estimation method requires the absence of second order serial correlation in
the …rst di¤erenced residuals for which the test of Arellano and Bond (1991) is presented
(labelled M2). If the underlying model’s residuals are indeed white noise then …rst-
order serial correlation should be expected in the …rst-di¤erenced residuals for which
we also present the test of Arellano and Bond (1991), labelled M1. We also report the
results of the Sargan test for instrument validity in the GMM-System equations and the
Di¤erence-Sargan statistic, which test the validity of the additional moment conditions
associated with the levels equations.
3.3 Basic results
Table 2 reports estimation results for …xed investment. Column 1 reports the results
of the basic speci…cation without …nancial variables. We generally …nd insigni…cant
levels of persistence in company-level investment, a result quite consistent with results
reported by Bond et al. (2003). The error-correction term (k¡y)it¡2 is correctly signed
and statistically signi…cant with coe¢cient (robust standard error) of -0.175 (0.022)
implying a reasonable speed of adjustment, comparable to that obtained in similar
studies. The sales growth terms are positive and signi…cant and their magnitude is in
the upper range of the values usually obtained in the literature. We …nd the expected
…rst-order serial correlation in our …rst-di¤erenced residuals while there is no evidence of
second order serial correlation, the key requirement for validity of our instrumentation
stategy and the Sargan test statistics are insigni…cant at conventional levels.7
We then consider adding the …nancial variables to the basic speci…cation. Columns
2 to 8 of Table 2 report the estimates of the basic speci…cation augmented with one …-
nancial variable at a time. First, columns 2 and 3 add debt variables to the standard
speci…cation. The expected negative coe¢cient is obtained although it is only at the
margin of signi…cance (p-value = 0.15) in the case of the B=Ait¡1 term. These estimates,
in particular that including the net indebtedness term (B ¡m)=Ait¡18, suggest that a
high level of debt can lead to balance sheet adjustment in the form of companies de-
ferring or foregoing investment projects (see also Vermeulen, 2002 for an industry-level
study). Second, in columns 4 and 5 two indicators of the relative debt-service burden
are included. For both variables (the interest debt burden term idbit¡1 in column 4 and
the total debt burden tdbit¡1 in column 5) a signi…cantly negative and well-determined
e¤ect is found. This suggests that the …nancial pressure of debt servicing plays an im-
portant role in in‡uencing investment levels of …rms. Third, the estimates in columns
6 and 7, include two indicators of corporate pro…tability. In both cases, (GR=A)it¡1 in
column 6 and (CF=A)it¡1 in column 7, the coe¢cients are signi…cantly positive, which
is consistent with studies of investment for other countries. As has been extensively
discussed in the literature on investment and …nancial constraints, the cash-‡ow terms
7In our preferred estimates (those reported in the tables) we selected the instrument set in order that
the Sargan test statistic reported was not signi…cant at conventional levels, although these estimates
proved very similar to those where the instrument set included instruments dated t¡ 2 to t ¡ 6 in the
…rst-di¤erenced equation and t¡ 1 in the levels equation.
8By including this indicator we want to test whether debt is important once adjusted for liquidity.
An indicator of liquidity (liquid assets divided by short term debt) turned out to be insigni…cant when
included in both the investment and the employment equations.
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might be either picking up the relevance of internal …nance for investment or acting as
as a proxy for investment opportunities. Finally, the results reported in column 8 show
that the indicator for the probability of default, pdit¡1, displays the expected negative
an d st at i s tic all y s i gn i… cant e¤e ct on i nve s tment. 9  T hi s in dic ato r b ein g a c omp osit e
measure based on several …nancial indicators, each of them weighted by its in‡uence on
the probability of default, its estimated coe¢cient in the investment equation re‡ects
the impact of the …nancial situation on corporate investment, through its incidence on
the probability of default.
Nevertheless, the relative importance of di¤erent …nancial variables in explaining
the probability of default or the probability of failure might di¤er from their relative
contribution to explaining real decisions of companies. Thus, in order to get a more
precise picture of the global impact of …nancial conditions on corporate behaviour, it is
worth directly and simultaneously including several …nancial indicators in the estimated
equations. Thus, it is possible to ascertain which speci…c …nancial features (indebted-
ness, pro…tability, …nancial burden...) are more relevant for each speci…c corporate
decision. However, the close links between the di¤erent …nancial indicators imply that
few indicators are likely to turn out to be simultaneously signi…cant. As a consequence,
the interpretation of the results of this exercise is not a trivial task. Table 3 reports the
estimates of speci…cations of the investment equation, simultaneously including several
…nancial variables. As can be seen from the tables, those variables measuring the burden
of servicing debt, both tdb and idb, remain signi…cant in all speci…cations and their co-
e¢cients are quite robust As regards the indicators of indebtedness, the gross measure
(B/A) is never signi…cant. In the case of the net debt term ((B-m)/A), it retains its
signi…cance in most cases. However, a notable decline in the point estimate of its coef-
…cient is observed when a pro…tability indicator is included. Finally, the coe¢cients for
the corporate pro…tability terms remain signi…cant in all speci…cations although their
point estimate is lower whenever the net debt term is included in the speci…cation.10
Our …rst set of estimation results for the employment equation is presented in
Table 4. Column 1 reports the results of the basic speci…cation without …nancial vari-
ables whereas columns 2 to 8 reports the results obtained when a …nancial variable is
added to the speci…cation. These results show the importance that …nancial factors
have in explaining labour demand. The results in columns 2 and 3 show that debt has a
negative (although non-signi…cant) impact on labour demand. However, when consid-
ering the two indicators of the relative burden of debt, both of them are seen to have a
negative and highly signi…cant impact on labour demand. The results of the estimation
when an indicator of pro…tability is included are reported in columns 6 and 7, and show
a positive and signi…cant impact of the pro…tability indicator on employment demand.
Finally, as in the case of the investment equation, a negative and signi…cant coe¢cient
is found for the indicator of the probability of default, pdit¡1.
Table 5 shows the results obtained when more than one …nancial variable is in-
cluded in the estimation. As can be seen in columns 1 and 4 for debt and 2 and 5 for
9The estimate for this variable should be viewed with some caution since the reported standard
errors do not take into account that it is an estimated regressor.
10Table 3 reports results for speci…cations including the gross revenue term (GR/A). The pattern of
results is qualitatively similar when the cash-‡ow term (CF/A) is included instead of GR/A.
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net indebtness, both indicators are also non-signi…cant when they are combined with
another …nancial variable. In contrast, indicators of debt burden mantain their signif-
icance when they are included in the estimation with an indebtedness or pro…tability
measure. The same applies to pro…tability indicators: they remain signi…cant when they
are combined with another indicator. Finally, columns 7 and 8 show that when three
…nancial indicators are included in the regression (one for indebtedness, another for debt
burden and the third one for pro…tability), the …rst is no longer signi…cant, as was also
the case when it was combined only with one additional indicator, whereas the indica-
tors of debt burden remain signi…cant at a 95% con…dence level and the pro…tability
terms are also signi…cant although their point estimates are somewhat reduced.
4 Non-linear e¤ects
The evidence presented in Section 2 shows that …rms with a weaker …nancial situation
-i.e. those …rms belonging to the decile of the distribution characterised by the highest
values of alternative proxies of …nancial pressure- have substantially lower investment
and employment growth rates. However, in general, no signi…cant di¤erences in demand
for factors of production are observed between the …rms with least …nancial tightness and
those with an average …nancial pressure. This evidence suggests that the relationship
between the real activity of …rms and their …nancial position is non-linear. Moreover,
a more pronounced impact of this position on real activity once the …nancial pressure
reaches a certain threshold seems reasonable. In this section, we provide a more formal
analysis of this hypothesis. For this purpose, we estimate the investment and labour
demand equations described in section 3, but now allowing for a di¤erential impact
of …nancial conditions depending on the relative level of the corresponding …nancial
indicator. As in Tables 2 and 4 we estimate the investment and employment models
considering one …nancial indicator at a time. In each regression, we test whether the
companies facing a high …nancial pressure -i.e. those …rms in the upper decile (or
quartile) of the distribution de…ned in terms of the corresponding …nancial indicator-
are more sensitive to the …nancial conditions. More precisely, we estimate the following
speci…cations:
µ
I
K
¶
it
= ®i + ¯1
µ
I
K
¶
it¡1
+ ¯2¢yit + ¯3¢yit¡1 + ¯4 (k ¡ y)it¡2
+°1FitD
F
0¡75 + °2FitD
F
75¡90 + °3FitD
F
90¡100 + µt + "it (3)
and
nit = Ái + ¸1nit¡1 + ¸2kit + ¸3wit¡1 + ¸4¢wit + ¸5»it +
+´1FitD
F
0¡75 + ´2FitD
F
75¡90 + ´3FitD
F
90¡100 +ªt + ¹it (4)
where DF0¡75, DF75¡90 and DF90¡100 are dummy variables for observations below
the 75th percentile, between the 75th and 90th percentiles, and above the 90th per-
centile, respectively, of the distribution de…ned in terms of the …nancial variable F .
16
When a corporate pro…tability measure -either (GR=A) or (CF=A) - is used as …nancial
indicator, we replace these dummies by DF0¡10, DF10¡25 and DF25¡100, which are dummy
variables for observations below the 10th percentile, between the 10th and 25th per-
centiles, and above the 25th percentile. In these cases, the lower the percentile, the
lower the pro…tability, and the higher, a priori, the degree of …nancial tightness.
4.1 Results
Table 6 reports the results obtained for investment when non-linearities are considered.
In the speci…cation allowing for a non-linear e¤ect of debt, debt is not signi…cant in
either of the groups of companies de…ned in terms of their level of debt. However,
when we consider net indebtedness instead of debt, we obtain evidence in favour of the
existence of di¤erences in the impact of this variable on investment, depending on its
magnitude: net indebtedness is irrelevant for …rms with low or moderate levels of net
indebtedness (below the 75th percentile), whereas for those …rms above this threshold
it has a negative and signi…cant impact both for the group between the 75th and 90th
percentiles and for the group in the upper decile.
When indicators of debt burden are considered, results strongly support the
existence of non-linearities: both indicators are signi…cant for …rms above the 90th
percentile, whereas for …ms between the 75th and the 90th percentile total debt burden is
found to be insigni…cant and interest debt burden is only at the margin of signi…cance
(p-value=0.09) For …rms below the 75th percentile, neither of these indicators has a
signi…cant impact on investment.
As for pro…tability indicators, a positive and signi…cant coe¢cient is obtained
for those …rms with higher pro…tability (those above the 25th percentile). However,
the coe¢cients for these variables are rather imprecisely estimated for the other two
groupings. As expected, we obtain a higher coe¢cient for those companies in the lower
tail of the distribution (a priori those facing a higher …nancial pressure). However, this
coe¢cient is only signi…cant for (CF=A).
Ideally, we would like to allow for non-linearities in the e¤ects of more than one
…nancial variable at a time. However, when simultaneously including di¤erent …nancial
variables in a non-linear fashion, there is a sharp drop of signi…cance in the interaction
terms. For this reason, we opted for a mixed strategy by including one …nancial variable
in a non linear-way and the rest of the …nancial variables linearly. Using this approach,
the results of our preferred speci…cation are reported in the last column of Table 6. In
this speci…cation, a linear e¤ect is allowed for gross revenue over total assets and for
net debt, while total debt burden enters in a non-linear way. We …nd, as expected, a
positive coe¢cient for (GR=A) and a negative one for net debt.11 Finally, a negative
impact of total debt burden is only found for …rms that are in the upper tail of the
distribution.
Results for employment are shown in Table 7, and corroborate the existence of
a non-linear impact of …nancial variables on …rms’ real decisions. We …nd, however,
some di¤erences with respect to investment: both indicators of indebtedness and debt
11Pro…tability and net debt enter linearly in the speci…cation, although in the table we present the
coe¢cient for each of the three groups (which is equal for all of them) separately.
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burden are signi…cant for …rms in the upper decile of the distribution, for a 99 per cent
con…dence level, but for …rms between the 75th and 90th percentile only indicators of
interest debt burden have a signi…cant impact on employment. When pro…tability is
considered, lower and upper bounds are found to be signi…cant, and, as was also the
case for investment, the coe¢cient estimated for the lower decile is higher than that
estimated for …rms with higher pro…tability (above the 25th percentile). As in the case
of investment, we also adopted a mixed strategy in the speci…cation of the …nancial
variables in the employment equation. The results of our preferred speci…cation are
reported in the last column of Table 7. In this speci…cation, a linear e¤ect is allowed
for gross revenue over total assets while total debt burden enters in a non-linear way. A
positive and signi…cant coe¢cient is found for the pro…tability term and a negative and
signi…cant one for total debt burden only for …rms that are above the 90th percentile.
Overall, these results corroborate the descriptive evidence in Section 2 and point
to the existence of threshold e¤ects on the impact of …nancial variables on investment
and employment.12 The speci…c threshold and the di¤erent sensitivities to the …nancial
position seem to depend on the particular …nancial variable considered.
5 Composite indicators of …nancial pressure
In Section 3, we obtained evidence in favour of the existence of a signi…cant impact of
…nancial variables on the demand for factors of production. The results in Section 4 sug-
gest that this impact is more pronounced for the upper tail of the distributions de…ned
in terms of the proxies for …nancial pressure. Now, in this section, we wish to construct
synthetic indicators that summarise the non-linear in‡uence that …nancing conditions
have on investment and employment. Moreover, on the basis of these composite indi-
cators we wish to assess how the impact of …nancial conditions has evolved over time
with a special emphasis on the distribution across companies of this impact. For this
purpose, we compute linear combinations of alternative sets of …nancial variables, where
the relative weights are given by the estimated coe¢cients in the investment and the
employment equations.
Thus, a …nancial conditions indicator (FCII) can be de…ned as follows:
FCIIit = ¡
X
k
°^kXkit (5)
where °^k is the estimated coe¢cient for …nancial variable Xk in the investment
equation. Analogously, a …nancial conditions indicator for employment takes the fol-
lowing form:
FCIEit = ¡
X
k
^´kXkit (6)
where ^´k is the estimated coe¢cient for …nancial variable Xk in the employment
equation. These indicators measure the contributions of the …nancial variables in the
12Although the results clearly support this conclusion, it should be pointed out that the results
reported in this section are more sensitive to the set of instruments used than those obtained for the
linear speci…cations presented in the previous section.
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investment and employment equations. As the sign of these contributions is changed,
the higher the indicator the tighter the …nancial conditions faced by companies, i.e.
the larger the negative impact of …nancial conditions on investment or employment.
Since we have allowed for a non-linear impact of …nancial variables, the di¤erences in
the indicator across …rms will re‡ect not only di¤erences in the …nancial position but
also di¤erences in the sensitivity of the real variables to this position. The lack of a
proper measure of the e¤ect of unobserved variables -including the unobserved individual
time-invariant e¤ect- makes it di¢cult to derive a precise measure of the importance
of the …nancial conditions relative to the remaining determinants of investment and
employment. However, these indicators represent a useful tool to compare (over time
and across groups of companies) the importance of …nancial conditions in the demand
for productive inputs.
Our starting point is to construct …nancial conditions indicators for investment
and employment on the basis of the estimated coe¢cients of our preferred models in
Section 4. In particular, our benchmark models are those in column 7 of Table 6 for
…xed investment and column 7 of Table 7 for employment. Both models allow for a non-
linear e¤ect of the total debt burden tdbit¡1, while restricting the impact of the gross
revenue term (GR=A) to be linear. In addition, the investment model also includes a
linear net debt term ((B ¡m)=A).
In order to ascertain the relevance of …nancial variables for companies in di¤erent
…nancial positions, it is useful to focus on di¤erent percentiles of the distribution of
these indicators. More precisely, we present the evolution of the median value of these
indicators as representative of the average …nancial pressure faced by the companies in
our sample. We also show the evolution of the 90th percentile, to assess the time pro…le
of the vulnerability of the companies facing a high …nancial pressure. Finally, we report
the weighted average as an aggregate indicator of the position of the corporate sector as a
whole. The weight for each …rm in this indicator will be given by its contribution to total
(aggregate) …xed assets, in the case of investment, or to total employment, in the case
of employment. To compare the di¤erent percentiles and the weighted average of the
…nancial indicators we normalise them by setting FCIImedian1990 =100 and FCIE
median
1990
=100.
Figure 4 displays the di¤erent percentiles and the weighted average of the indica-
tors for the impact of …nancing conditions on investment and employment. In the case
of …xed investment (Panel A of Figure 4), the di¤erent percentiles and the weighted
average display a similar countercyclical pattern. According to the median FCII, the
second half of the 1980s was characterised by a relaxation of …nancial conditions which
was mostly explained by the reduction in corporate debt in a period of high nominal
interest rates and, to a lesser extent, by a certain recovery in corporate pro…tability.
In the early 1990, this indicator shows a tightening of …nancial conditions as a result
of an intense deterioration of corporate pro…tability.13 After reaching a peak in 1993,
the median FCII declined continuously until 1998, owing to the reduction in the level
of debt. In this period, there is also a modest improvement in corporate pro…tability.
13 Interestingly, if we consider FCIIs derived from models excluding measures of pro…tability (for
instance, models in columns 2 and 5 of Table 3), the tightening of …nancial conditions during the
cyclical downturn of the early 1990s is less severe.
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Finally, the median FCII displays a slight increase in the last three years of the sample
owing to a slight reduction in corporate pro…ts.
The comparison of the median and the weighted average FCII shows that the
weighted average presents higher values for the entire period, implying that the …nancial
position for those …rms that are more relevant for investment is weaker than that of
the median. Furthermore, in some periods a di¤erent evolution pattern of behaviour is
observed for the representative (median) …rm and the weighted average. For instance,
the important tightening in …nancial conditions observed in year 2001 for the weighted
average is not so clearly seen in the median, that has shown a more stable behaviour in
the last part of the sample.
Again, the comparison of the median FCII with the higher percentiles reveals that
it is in the recessions, especially in the cyclical trough of 1993, when the impact of the
…nancing conditions on investment increased relatively more for the most vulnerable
companies than for companies with an average …nancial pressure.14 It is also worth
noting that the observed increase in the median in the last years of the sample is not
observed for the …rms in the upper decile of the distribution.
In the case of employment (Panel B of Figure 4), our preferred …nancial indicator
is a weighted average of the total debt burden and the gross-revenue term. As previously
mentioned, a non-linear e¤ect is allowed for the total debt burden term. The pro…le
of the di¤erent percentiles of the FCIE is quite similar to that of the FCII. First, the
di¤erent percentiles display a countercyclical pattern and, second, this pattern is more
evident in the case of the highest percentile. Nevertheless, the weighted average indicator
displays a larger cyclical variation than in the case of the FCII. Again, the median
indicator is not a good proxy of the position of the sector as a whole, although in this
case the di¤erence between the median and the weighted average indicator diminished
in the last part of the sample. In fact, the median exceeded the weighted average in the
last part of the sample period (after 1998), something that was not seen in the FCII.
The tightening in …nancial conditions observed in 2001 for the weighted average FCII
is also seen in the FCIE.
Finally, for the sake of comparison, we show in Figure 5 the indicator of …nancial
fragility based on the model of Benito et al (2003) for the probability of default. As in
the case of our indicators of the impact of …nancial conditions, we display the median,
the 90th percentile and the weighted average. In this case, the weights are given by
the total assets of the …rm with respect to the aggregate level of assets. The cyclical
pro…le of the di¤erent percentiles of the distribution of this indicator is quite similar to
those reported in Figure 4. The median value for this indicator oscillates between 0.002
and 0.009 while the 90th percentile varies from 0.012 to 0.057. As regards the weighted
average values, in the most recent period the deterioration in …nancial conditions started
in 1998 according to this …nancial fragility indicator, while according to our indicators
it is only in 2001 that there was a tightening in …nancing conditions.
14As expected, the value of the 90th percentile of the indicator based on a non-linear speci…cation is
higher, over the whole sample period, than the value of the 90th percentile of an indicator constructed
with the same variables but without considering non-linearities. And, interestingly, it is in the recession
when this di¤erence is larger. For the weighted average indicator, a linear especi…cation also yields a
degree of fragility persistently lower than that reported here, including non-linearities.
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Overall, this evidence shows the relevance of using …rm-level data when analysing
the changes in the …nancial position and suggests that …nancing conditions do not a¤ect
all companies equally. A tightening of …nancial conditions will have a signi…cantly
greater e¤ect on the real decisions of those …rms with lower …nancial soundness. This
is particularly relevant in episodes where the …nancial pressure on a signi…cant number
of …rms breaches the threshold at which it has a more intense in‡uence on business
activity. In these episodes, indicators based on aggregate data may not reliably re‡ect
the system’s …nancial soundness since they do not adequately re‡ect the deterioration
of the …nancial position of the more vulnerable companies.
6 Conclusions
This paper has aimed to assess the impact of …nancial conditions on …rms’ real decisions,
using a large-scale company-level panel dataset for the period 1985-2001. The analysis
has focused on the behaviour of …xed investment and employment which are conceiv-
ably two of the most important aspects of adjustment by …rms in response to changes
in …nancial conditions. Within the general topic of the relationship between …nancial
conditions and real activity, we have addressed three speci…c issues: …rst, the assess-
ment of the relative importance of di¤erent …nancial variables in explaining the real
decisions of …rms; second, the analysis of the non-linearity in the relationship between
…nancial proxies and real variables; and, …nally, the construction of a synthetic indica-
tor to capture the impact of …nancing conditions on investment (and, alternatively, on
employment).
Our results strongly indicate that …nancial position is important to explain cor-
porate decisions on …xed investment and employment. Several …nancial indicators turn
out to be signi…cant in the estimated equations. In particular, measures of the debt-
service burden (both including and excluding the stock of short-term debt) remain
signi…cant when additional …nancial indicators are incorporated and their coe¢cients
are quite robust. As regards the indicators of corporate pro…tability, they are signi…cant
in all speci…cations, although their point estimates depend on the additional …nancial
variables included in the speci…cation. Finally, the evidence for the indicators of indebt-
edness is less conclusive. In the investment equation the net debt term is signi…cant in
most cases. In the employment equation, the debt terms are never signi…cant in the
linear speci…cations but they are signi…cant for the upper decile of the distribution when
considering non-linear speci…cations.
We have found evidence in favour of the hypothesis of a non-linear relationship
between …nancial conditions and real activity. At a pure descriptive level, we have shown
that the group of …rms facing a higher degree of …nancial pressure, that we identify as
those in the upper decile of the cross-sectional distribution of …rms de…ned in terms
of alternative …nancial indicators, have substantially lower investment and employment
growth rates. The regression analysis has corroborated this result: the sensitivity of in-
vestment and employment to …nancial conditions is substantially larger for those …rms
in the upper quartile (or decile) of the distribution de…ned in terms of the correspond-
ing …nancial indicator. Moreover, in some speci…cations, the …nancial variable is not
signi…cant for the companies facing a moderate (or low) degree of …nancial tightness.
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Overall, this evidence suggests that the real impact of …nancial conditions is non-linear
and becomes relatively more intense when …nancial pressure exceeds a certain threshold.
As a consequence, from the standpoint of identifying the risks to macroeconomic and
…nancial stability, the use of …rm-level data seems to be particularly relevant in episodes
where the …nancial pressure on a signi…cant number of …rms reaches levels at which it
has a more pronounced in‡uence on real activity. In these episodes, indicators based on
aggregate data may not reliably re‡ect the system’s …nancial soundness since they do
not adequately re‡ect the vulnerability of the most fragile companies. In addition, the
analysis of our composite indicators constructed at the …rm-level reveals that neither
the level nor the changes in the …nancial pressure experienced by the representative
(median) …rm is a good measure of the …nancial pressure faced by the corporate sec-
tor. In fact, in the last year of our sample (2001) the observed increase in our median
indicators is much lower than that observed for the weighted average.
As regards the most recent data, our composite indicators for the impact of
…nancial conditions on investment and employment remain at moderate levels, in his-
torical terms. At an aggregate level, Spanish …rms have shown an increase in debt
ratios, although this has not been translated into a higher debt-service burden due to
the declining path of interest rates. Thus, the …nancial position of the corporate sec-
tor will not foreseeably represent, on average, a signi…cant obstacle to the recovery in
investment and employment. Moreover, a more disaggregated analysis shows that, in
the most recent period, the increase in debt ratios for those …rms in a weaker …nan-
cial position, which are, according to our results, the most sensitive to changes in their
…nancial position, has been lower than that observed in the aggregate. Furthermore,
the available information for 2003 reveals that the companies with highest indebtedness
have indeed experienced reductions in their debt ratios. Nonetheless, the high level of
debt at some of these …rms, suggests that their ability to obtain additional external
funds is now lower and that their exposure to potential shocks is higher. Additionally,
our analysis has shown that …nancial conditions for those …rms that are more relevant
for investment, and, to a lesser extent, for employment, are tighter than those for the
median (representative) …rm, and, therefore these companies may be more in‡uenced
by shocks a¤ecting their …nancial position.
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Table 1: Sample medians
1985-1988 1989-1992 1993-1996 1997-2001 1985-2001
I=K investment rate 0.118 0.103 0.076 0.111 0.100
N employment 65 47 35 37 43
Y real sales (1995 prices) 7580.6 5525.9 4213.92 4357.3 5088.8
¢y sales growth 0.038 -0.007 0.013 0.041 0.021
¢w wage growth 0.012 0.022 0.004 0.005 0.010
B=A debt 0.301 0.247 0.269 0.249 0.263
(B ¡m)=A net indebtedness 0.207 0.164 0.173 0.140 0.168
B=GR debt over gross revenue 1.500 1.424 1.645 1.489 1.514
idb interest debt burden 0.188 0.216 0.214 0.100 0.167
tdb total debt burden 1.052 1.037 1.013 0.714 0.944
GR=A gross revenue 0.216 0.188 0.162 0.168 0.179
CF=A cash-‡ow 0.130 0.105 0.095 0.115 0.110
pd probabilty of default 0.007 0.009 0.012 0.007 0.009
observations 12,444 18,294 19,448 20,439 70,625
Notes: See Data Appendix for the de…nition of the variables.
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Table 2: Fixed investment
(I=K)it [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
(I=K)it¡1 -0.057 (0.099) -0.020 (0.083) -0.084 (0.057) -0.094 (0.085) -0.055 (0.085) -0.099 (0.090) -0.113 (0.087) -0.037 (0.079)
¢yit 0.358 (0.124) 0.365 (0.111) 0.347 (0.109) 0.329 (0.095) 0.294 (0.098) 0.312 (0.111) 0.386 (0.113) 0.271 (0.099)
¢yit¡1 0.334 (0.112) 0.313 (0.106) 0.379 (0.088) 0.271 (0.086) 0.260 (0.086) 0.321 (0.103) 0.290 (0.104) 0.205 (0.059)
(k ¡ y)it¡2 -0.175 (0.022) -0.164 (0.020) -0.171 (0.017) -0.168 (0.020) -0.162 (0.020) -0.161 (0.020) -0.158 (0.019) -0.158 (0.018)
(B=A)it¡1 -0.070 (0.050)
((B ¡m)=A)it¡1 -0.091 (0.027)
idbit¡1 -0.024 (0.008)
tdbit¡1 -0.004 (0.001)
(GR=A)it¡1 0.201 (0.097)
(CF=A)it¡1 0.331 (0.126)
pdit¡1 -0.938 (0.352)
M1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
M2 0.785 0.469 0.903 0.927 0.739 0.840 0.747 0.539
Sargan 0.188 0.170 0.402 0.091 0.374 0.142 0.156 0.229
Di¤erence-Sargan 0.985 0.931 0.893 0.899 0.999 0.997 0.985 0.999
companies 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547
observations 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531
Notes: All equations include time dummies (year e¤ects). Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method
(Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported), with a chi-
square distribution under the null of instrument validity. Di¤erence-Sargan is a Sargan Test of the additional moment conditions associated
with the levels equations (p-value reported), distributed as a chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Mj is a test of jth-order serial
correlation in the …rst-di¤erenced residuals (p-values reported). These are both distributed as standard normals under the null hypotheses.
Asymptotic robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Instruments: in …rst-di¤erences equation, following lagged values of the regressors:
¢y;B=A;GR=A;CF=A (t-4, t-5), (k ¡ y) (t-5, t-6) (B ¡m)=A (t-2 to t-5), idb; tdb; pd (t-3 to t-5). In levels equations, …rst di¤erences
of the regressors dated as follows: I=K;¢y;B=A; (B ¡m)=A; idb; tdb (t-2), pd (t-1), (k ¡ y);GR=A;CF=A (t-3).
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Table 3: Fixed investment
(I=K)it [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
(I=K)it¡1 -0.054 ( 0.075) -0. 1 01 ( 0. 0 53 ) - 0. 1 07 ( 0. 0 79 ) - 0. 0 22 ( 0. 0 76 ) -0 . 08 5 (0 . 05 3) - 0 . 07 6 ( 0 . 07 9) - 0. 1 17 ( 0. 0 57 ) -0 . 13 3 ( 0 . 05 7)
¢yit 0.316 (0.090) 0.329 (0.088) 0.302 (0.089) 0.277 (0.092) 0.296 (0.089) 0.270 (0.092) 0.292 (0.084) 0.322 (0.083)
¢yit¡1 0.257 (0.083) 0.336 (0.071) 0.278 (0.082) 0.245 (0.084) 0.338 (0.072) 0.285 (0.082) 0.364 (0.071) 0.357 (0.070)
(k ¡ y)it¡2 -0.159 (0.019) -0.167 (0.017) -0.158 (0.018) -0.154 (0.019) -0.166 (0.017) -0.155 (0.018) -0.160 (0.017) -0.161 (0.017)
(B=A)it¡1 -0.033 (0.048) -0.020 (0.049)
((B ¡m)=A)it¡1 -0.075 (0.027) -0.071 (0.027) -0.044 (0.031) -0.046 (0.031)
idbit¡1 -0.024 (0.009) -0.018 (0.009) -0.017 (0.010) -0.015 (0.009)
tdbit¡1 -0.004 (0.001) -0.003 (0.001) -0.003 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)
(GR=A)it¡1 0.162 (0.094) 0.151 (0.094) 0.153 (0.065) 0.155 (0.065)
(CF=A)it¡1
M1 0.00 0 0 .000 0.00 0 0 .000 0.00 0 0.000 0.000 0 .000
M2 0.706 0.671 0.754 0.449 0.907 0.962 0.465 0.312
Sargan 0.097 0.230 0.087 0.362 0.514 0.275 0.257 0.115
Di¤erence-Sargan 0.81 8 0 .622 0.98 0 0 .974 0.88 9 0.999 0.319 0 .390
companies 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547
observations 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531
Notes: See notes to Table 2.
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Table 4: Employment
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
nit¡1 0.915 (0.020) 0.924 (0.015) 0.910 (0.017) 0.943 (0.016) 0.941 (0.017) 0.934 (0.019) 0.927 (0.019) 0.925 (0.017)
kit 0.039 (0.008) 0.037 (0.007) 0.042 (0.007) 0.030 (0.007) 0.030 (0.007) 0.036 (0.007) 0.034 (0.007) 0.039 (0.008)
¢wit -0.535 (0.118) -0.533 (0.109) -0.522 (0.104) -0.416 (0.097) -0.507 (0.101) -0.518 (0.092) -0.501 (0.099) -0.436 (0.110)
wit¡1 -0.017 (0.053) -0.023 (0.044) -0.002 (0.048) -0.053 (0.042) -0.037 (0.043) -0.047 (0.047) -0.012 (0.046) 0.007 (0.047)
¢yit 0.303 (0.047) 0.305 (0.044) 0.301 (0.044) 0.300 (0.046) 0.299 (0.044) 0.272 (0.041) 0.306 (0.043) 0.312 (0.043)
(B=A)it¡1 -0.012 (0.021)
((B ¡m)=A)it¡1 -0.010 (0.013)
idbit¡1 -0.022 (0.007)
tdbit¡1 -0.003 (0.001)
(GR=A)it¡1 0.127 (0.031)
(CF=A)it¡1 0.113 (0.041)
pdit¡1 -0.856 (0.373)
M1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
M2 0.082 0.088 0.075 0.117 0.068 0.041 0.088 0.105
Sargan 0.443 0.242 0.444 0.471 0.647 0.657 0.362 0.273
Di¤erence-Sargan 0. 0 75 0 . 4 89 0. 4 06 0 . 13 0 0 . 28 3 0. 1 79 0. 0 83 0 . 04 4
companies 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547
observations 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531
Notes: All equations include time dummies (year e¤ects). Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method
(Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported), with a chi-
square distribution under the null of instrument validity. Di¤erence-Sargan is a Sargan Test of the additional moment conditions associated
with the levels equations (p-value reported), distributed as a chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Mj is a test of jth-order serial
correlation in the …rst-di¤erenced residuals (p-values reported). These are both distributed as standard normals under the null hypotheses.
Asymptotic robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Instruments: in …rst-di¤erences equation, following lagged values of the regressors:
n;B=A; (B ¡m)=A (t-5), a;¢y;¢w (t-5, t-6), w;GR=A;CF=A (t-4, t-5), idb; tdb; pd (t-4 to t-6). In levels equations, …rst di¤erences of
the regressors dated as follows: n;¢w;B=A; (B ¡m)=A (t-2), idb; tdb; pd;CF=A (t-3), GR=A (t-4).
26
Table 5: Employment
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
nit¡1 0.944 (0.013) 0.936 (0.015) 0.950 (0.016) 0.940 (0.013) 0.930 (0.016) 0.945 (0.015) 0.951 (0.015) 0.950 (0.015)
kit 0.029 (0.006) 0.032 (0.007) 0.026 (0.007) 0.030 (0.007) 0.035 (0.007) 0.030 (0.007) 0.027 (0.007) 0.025(0.007)
¢wit -0.435 (0.090) -0.433 (0.086) -0.454 (0.082) -0.503 (0.095) -0.500 (0.082) -0.525 (0.076) -0.522 (0.073) -0.453 (0.077)
wit¡1 -0.036 (0.038) -0.033 (0.039) -0.048 (0.039) -0.022 (0.038) -0.037 (0.044) -0.039 (0.037) -0.034 (0.035) -0.038 (0.037)
¢yit 0.292 (0.043) 0.291 (0.043) 0.307 (0.042) 0.288 (0.041) 0.271 (0.038) 0.277 (0.035) 0.274 (0.033) 0.295 (0.039)
(B=A)it¡1 0.016 (0.024) 0.016 ( 0.026) 0.005 (0.027)
((B ¡m)=A)it¡1 0.007 (0.014) 0.021 (0.015) 0.010 (0.016)
idbit¡1 -0.023 (0.007) -0.022 (0.008) -0.017 (0.008) -0.014 (0.008)
tdbit¡1 -0.003 (0.001) -0.003 (0.001) -0.003 (0.001)
(GR=A)it¡1 0.097 (0.019) 0.102 (0.019) 0.112 (0.020)
(CF=A)it¡1 0.084 (0.044) 0.114 (0.044)
M1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
M2 0.086 0.084 0.113 0.054 0.042 0.038 0.035 0.084
Sargan 0.201 0.400 0.525 0.191 0.416 0.639 0.591 0.230
Di¤erence-Sargan 0.210 0.144 0.034 0.154 0.079 0.179 0.187 0.031
companies 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547
observations 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531 55,531
Notes: See notes to Table 4.
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Table 6: Investment. Non-linear e¤ects.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
(I=K)it¡1 -0.089 (0.066) -0.076 (0.069) -0.102 (0.069) -0.098 (0.074) -0.114 (0.076) -0.134 (0.075) -0.141 (0.050)
¢yit 0.293 (0.096) 0.346 (0.093) 0.356 (0.090) 0.261 (0.093) 0.344 (0.090) 0.362 (0.092) 0.284 (0.077)
¢yit¡1 0.245 (0.095) 0.354 (0.091) 0.339 (0.088) 0.335 (0.087) 0.356 (0.088) 0.290 (0.090) 0.361 (0.067)
(k ¡ y)it¡2 -0.171 (0.018) -0.166 (0.018) -0.170 (0.018) -0.170 (0.019) -0.166 (0.019) -0.159 (0.018) -0.162 (0.016)
(B=A)it¡1(< p75) 0.072 (0.077)
(B=A)it¡1(> p75;< p90) -0.013 (0.059)
(B=A)it¡1(> p90) -0.052 (0.054)
((B ¡m)=A)it¡1(< p75) -0.061 (0.047) -0.052 (0.030)*
((B ¡m)=A)it¡1(> p75;< p90) -0.147 (0.062) -0.052 (0.030)*
((B ¡m)=A)it¡1(> p90) -0.127 (0.048) -0.052 (0.030)*
(idb)it¡1(< p75) -0.081 (0.096)
(idb)it¡1(> p75;< p90) -0.100 (0.060)
(idb)it¡1(> p90) -0.031 (0.009)
(tdb)it¡1(< p75) -0.007 (0.008) -0.004 (0.007)
(tdb)it¡1(> p75;< p90) -0.005 (0.010) 0.011 (0.010)
(tdb)it¡1(> p90) -0.004 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)
(GR=A)it¡1(> p25) 0.202 (0.101) 0.165 (0.063)*
(GR=A)it¡1(> p10;< p25) 0.662 (1.103) 0.165 (0.063)*
(GR=A)it¡1(< p10) 0.658 (0.727) 0.165 (0.063)*
(CF=A)it¡1(> p25) 0.311 (0.135)
(CF=A)it¡1(> p10;< p25) 3.470 (2.770)
(CF=A)it¡1(< p10) 0.890 (0.447)
M1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
M2 0.978 0.988 0.756 0.812 0.643 0.486 0.201
Sargan 0.068 0.254 0.032 0.259 0.082 0.395 0.187
Di¤erence-Sargan 0.818 0.882 0.636 0.803 0.849 0.878 0.684
Notes: See notes to Table 2. Number of companies: 7,547. Number of observations: 55,531. (*) Coe¢cients restricted to be equal.
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Table 7: Employment. Non-linear e¤ects.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
nit¡1 0.922 (0.014) 0.905 (0.015) 0.934 (0.014) 0.931 (0.014) 0.926 (0.016) 0.940 (0.026) 0.958 (0.013)
kit 0.035 (0.007) 0.041 (0.007) 0.033 (0.007) 0.034 (0.007) 0.032 (0.007) 0.029 (0.007) 0.019 (0.006)
¢wit -0.510 (0.092) -0.492 (0.092) -0.635 (0.087) -0.550 (0.087) -0.637 (0.080) -0.519 (0.077) -0.554 (0.075)
wit¡1 0.000 (0.039) 0.043 (0.041) -0.021 (0.037) -0.003 (0.035) 0.012 (0.040) -0.026 (0.039) -0.050 (0.032)
¢yit 0.297 (0.038) 0.293 (0.042) 0.313 (0.041) 0.286 (0.038) 0.280 (0.038) 0.280 (0.037) 0.280 (0.035)
(B=A)it¡1(< p75) 0.032 (0.034)
(B=A)it¡1(> p75;< p90) 0.015 (0.029)
(B=A)it¡1(> 90) -0.042 (0.023)
((B ¡m)=A)it¡1(< p75) -0.001 (0.015)
((B ¡m)=A)it¡1(> p75;< p90) 0.001 (0.025)
((B ¡m)=A)it¡1(< p90) -0.052 (0.023)
(idb)it¡1(< p75) -0.039 (0.051)
(idb)it¡1(> p75;< p90) -0.109 (0.033)
(idb)it¡1(> p90) -0.034 (0.005)
(tdb)it¡1(< p75) 0.006 (0.004) 0.005 (0.005)
(tdb)it¡1(> p75;< p90) -0.001 (0.004) 0.006 (0.005)
(tdb)it¡1(> p90) -0.004 (0.001) -0.003 (0.001)
(GR=A)it¡1(> p25) 0.090 (0.012) 0.085 (0.019)*
(GR=A)it¡1(> p10;< p25) 0.116 (0.060) 0.085 (0.019)*
(GR=A)it¡1(< p10) 0.304 (0.090) 0.085 (0.019)*
(CF=A)it¡1(> p25) 0.067 (0.044)
(CF=A)it¡1(> p10;< p25) -1.350 (1.134)
(CF=A)it¡1(< p10) 0.549 (0.185)
M1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
M2 0.067 0.052 0.093 0.039 0.045 0.049 0.048
Sargan 0.151 0.334 0.107 0.155 0.567 0.564 0.440
Di¤erence-Sargan 0.235 0.332 0.168 0.149 0.086 0.348 0.164
Notes: See notes to Table 4. Number of companies: 7,547. Number of observations: 55,531. (*) Coe¢cients restricted to be equal.
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Note: NA: National Accounts. CBSO: Central Balance Sheet Data Office
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Figure 2
PERCENTILES OF DISTRIBUTIONS OF FINANCIAL VARIABLES
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Figure 3
FINANCIAL POSITION AND LEVEL OF ACTIVITY
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Figure 4
COMPOSITE INDICATORS OF THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
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   Note: The indicator of financial fragility is an indicator of the probability of default, based on Benito 
et al. (2003). See the data appendix for a brief description of this indicator.
Figure 5
FINANCIAL FRAGILITY INDICATOR
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Data Appendix
Table A.1 tabulates the number of time-series observations per company.
Table A.1: Panel structure
No of observations 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Companies 1,268 1,109 913 658 581 379 352
No of observations 12 13 14 15 16 17 Total
Companies 411 365 415 400 234 462 7,547
Investment (I)
Purchase of new …xed assets.
Capital stock (K)
Fixed assets at replacement cost (calculated by the Central Balance Sheet Data
O¢ce (CBSO) of the Banco de España). When introduced in real terms, K is de‡ated
by the Gross Fixed Capital Formation de‡ator.
Total assets (A)
This is given by the sum of …xed assets at replacement costK and working capital
less provisions.
Employment (N)
The number of employees during the year. The data also distinguish between
the number on permanent and temporary contracts.
Real Sales (S)
Total company sales, de‡ated by the GDP de‡ator.
Wages (W )
The average company wage is given by direct employment costs (not including
social security contributions) divided by the employment head count and de‡ated by
the GDP de‡ator.
Gross revenue over total assets (GR=A)
Gross operating pro…t plus …nancial revenue divided by total assets.
Debt (B=A)
Total outstanding debt divided by total assets.
Debt over gross revenue (B=GR)
Total outstanding debt divided by gross revenue, GR.
Net Debt ((B ¡m)=A)
Total outstanding debt less cash and its equivalents divided by total assets.
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Interest debt burden (idb)
Interest payments divided by gross revenue.
Total debt burden (tdb)
Interest payments plus short-term debt over gross revenue.
Cash ‡ow (CF=A)
Post-tax pro…t plus depreciation of …xed assets divided by total assets.
Probability of default (pd)
Based on Benito et al (2003), it is obtained from the estimation of a probit model
which has as explanatory variables real sales, debt, interest debt burden, short-term debt
without cost over total debt, pro…tability, liquidity, a dummy indicating if the …rm pays
dividends and the growth rate of gross domestic product.
For interest debt burden and total debt burden, where companies have a negative
or zero value for the denominator and a positive value for the numerator the ratio is
set equal to the value of the 99th percentile that year; where the numerator is zero, the
ratio is set equal to zero, for any value of the denominator. Additionally, for all the
variables used as regressors (except those that enter in levels), when the value is higher
than the 99th percentile, it is changed for the value of this percentile.
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